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evidently upon the hypothesis that an extra territorial sale of a
patented article was a necessary subject of discussion.
But with this scrutiny of these cases, we are unembarrassed by
the rule of comity which would lead us to conform our own judg-
ment to that pronounced by the Circuit Courts elsewhere for the
sake of uniformity of decision ; and in view of the state of the law
as it has been expounded by the Supreme Court, we feel authorized
to express our own judgment, that a sale of patented articles, in
the ordinary course of trade, outside the territorial limits to-which
the right to sell is restricted by the patentee's grant, is unwar-
ranted.
There must, therefore, be a decree in favor of the complainant,
with costs.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
1
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA.
2
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.3
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE."
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN. 5
AGENCY.
General Agent-Authority- Usage of Trade- Contracts- What con-
stitutes.-A general agent is one authorized to transact all the business
of his principal, or all his business of some particular kind: National
Furnace Co. v. Key/stone Mfg. Co., 110 Ill.
In the case of a general agent the law permits usage to enter into and
enlarge the liability of the principal, in respect to contracts made by
the agent; and it has been held that the usages of a particular trade or
business are admissible for the purpose of interpreting the powers given
to an agent or factor : Id.
A corporation engaged in the manufacture of pig iron, adopted,
through its directory, a resolution, as follows: "Resolved, that A. B.,
of Chicago, be and is hereby appointed and employed by this company
as its sole agent for the consignment and sale of its entire product, he to
receive a commission," &c. This agent assumed to authorize another
to make contracts in respect to the subject-matter of the agency, and
1 Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1884. The cases will probably appear in 112 U. S. Rep.
f From J. H. Lumpkin, Esq., Reporter; the cases will probably appear in 61
or 62 Ga. Rep.
3 From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter ; to appear in 110 Ill. Rep.
4 From J. W. Spaulding, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 76 Me. Rep.
6 From Frederick K. Conover, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 61 Wis. Rep.
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the latter did contract, on behalf of the corporation, with another mauu-
fTcturing company, to supply the latter with all the pig iron they should
need, use or consume in their business during the then ensuing season
of such business. It was shown to have been the custom in Chicago
for iron brokers to employ salesmen to make contracts with manufac.
turers of like kind for the year's supply of iron, to be delivered as
ordered. On the question as to the authority of the agent, it was held,
that under the resolution appointing him, in connection with the usage
of trade in Chicago among this class of dealers, he had authority, as the
general agent of his principal, to contract, through the instrumentality
employed, for the sale of iron thereafter to be produced, and to be
delivered in the future as ordered. His authority was not limited
merely to the sale of the iron when it was ready for the market: Id.
And aside from any usage or custom among dealers, trhe resolution of
appointment itself was broad enough in its terms to constitute the per-
son appointed. the general agent of the principal, in respect to the busi-
ness to which it related, and authorized him to contract for the future
delivery of iron, as was done : Id.
A SSIGNMENT.
Reservation of Exempt Property by Firm.-A reservation in an
assignment by a co-partnership, of such articles "as are by law exempt
from seizure hnd sale on execution" is inoperative, because the law gives
the firm, as such, no exemptions. Such a reservation does not, there-
fore, render the assignment void for uncertainty : Goll v. Hubbell, 61
Wis.
ATTACHMENT.
Set-off- Unmatured Note.-At the time of the service of the writ on
the alleged trustees, they, as a firm, were indebted to the principal
defendant railroad company in the sum of $607.58 for freight. Prior
to such service the railroad company gave its note for the payment of
$550, amply secured, to one of the members of the firm, payable after
such service but before the disclosure. At maturity of the note, by
agreement between the payee and the railroad company, its amount was
credited upon the firm's indebtedness to the company; and the note, with
its collateral security, was surrendered to the company. Held, that the
trustees were chargeable for the whole amount of their indebtedness to
the company, without deducting the amount of the note: Donnell v.
.Portland & Ogdensburg Railroad Co., 76 Me.
Ingalls v. Dennett, 6 Me. 79, commented upon: Id.
ATTORNEY. See Practice.
BROKER.
Compensationfrom both Parties.-One who, in the sale or exchangeof
property, acts merely as a middleman to bring the parties together, they
making their own contract, may recover compensation from both parties:
Orion v. Scofield, 61 Wis.
COMMON CARRIER.
Passenger-Ticket-Conditions.-Where, upon the sale of a round-
trip ticket with coupons attached for passage over two roads, a special
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contr;,et was'made to the effect that the passenger should sign his name
in Jacksonville, Florida (the terminal point of the trip), before the
agent there, before he eould return on the ticket, such special contract
controlled; and if the passenger failed to sign as agreed the company
had the right to eject him. This being done politely by the conductor,
the passenger was not entitled to damages. Moses v. E., T., V. & G.
Railroad, 61 or 62 Ga.
The ticket being for the purpose of passing him over two roads, each
had the right to stand on the contract; and if one passed hiui the other
was not bound thereby to pass him also, in the teeth of the special con-
tract : .d.
The fact that the conductor of the contracting road, upon the return
,of the passenger detached the last coupon before refusing and returning.it
and the ticket to the passenger, did not affect the action brought by the
latter for being ejected. With or without the coupon he was not enti-
tled to travel over the road on the ticket against his'contract: Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Criminal Law.
Prohibition by Ordinance, of Smoke from Pug.boats in Harbor-Regu-
lation of Commerce-Poliee power of State-Delegation to .Municipality.
-An ordinance of the city of Chicago, making the owners, &c., of tug-
boats, engines, &c., liable for allowing the emiision of dense smoke from
their smoke-stacks, is not in violation of sect. 8, art. 1, of the Federal
Constitution, which declares that "Congress shall have power to regu-
late commerce," &e. Such a regulation by the city does not impose any
restraint on the use of such vessels, although engaged in general com-
merce, other than' is consistent with law. Controlling the use of tug-
boats in towing in and out vessels from the harbor, is in no sense in
conflict with the power existing in congress to regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the several states: Harrmon v. City of C/i-
cago, 110 Ill.
The existence of a power in congress to control harbors, and the
towing in and out merchant vessels engaged in commerce with fureign
nations and with the several states, does not of itself prevent local legis-
lation for the security of property, and the health, comfort and conve-
nience of the people in a municipality. It is only repugnant and
interfering state legislation that must give way to the paramount laws
of congress constitutionally enacted : Id.
A state has all power necessary for the protection of the property,
health and comfort of the public, and it may delegate this power to
local municipalities in such measure as may be deemed desirable for the
best interests of the public; and the state may resume it again when
deemed expedient: Id.
CONTRACT.
Mutualiy.-A contract between a manufacturer of pig iron and an-
other who is engaged in a business requiring the use of that article, that
the former will supply to the latter, and that the latter will purchase from -
him, all the pig iron which he should need, use or consume in his busi-
ness during the then ensuing season of such business, fixing the limit of
time---such amount supposed by the parties to be about a certain named
quantity-is not wanting in the element of mutuality. The buyer is as
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much bound to procure from the seller all the pig iron he should need
in his business during the stipulated time, as the seller is to furnish it,
National Furnace Co. v. Keystone fMfg. Co., 110 Ill.
Consideration- Waiver of Lien-Statute of Prauds.-The waiver by
a sub-contractor of a lien for materials furnished for the erection of a
building, and the discharge of the principal contractor from liability
therefbr, constitutes a sufficient consideration for a promise by the
owner of the building to pay for such materials: Griswold v. Wright,
61 Wis.
It seems that such promise is not within the Statute of Frauds, and
need not be in writing : Id.
Interpretation of-Parol Evidence to vary Writings-Letter.-A let-
ter containing an offer to pay a specified sum for certain services, and
the acceptance of such offer evidenced by the performance of the ser-
vices, constitute a contract in writing between the parties, and evidence
of an antecedent or, contemporaneous verbal agreement is inadmissible
to vary or control such written agreement. Whether parol testimony
is inadmissible to show that such letter was not intended as an agree-
ment but was written for another purpose, is not determined: Booker
v. Hyde, 61 Wis.
A. offered in writing to pay B. $1000 if the latter would help him to
effect the sale of certain lands. In an action by B. to recover the said
amount it was admitted that he had rendered the services required of
him, and both parties, in their pleadings, construed the agreement to
be that B. should use his best efforts to bring about the sale. Hell,
that parol evidence was not admissible to explain the word "help :" Id.
CRImINAL LAW. See Surety.
Waiver of Constitutional Right.-The accused may waive Eis consti-
tutional right to meet the witnesses face to face: Williams v. State, 61
Wis.
DAMAGES.
Land takenfor Public Use-Market Value.-The true test as to
damages to be paid for land taken for a public use, is its market value
for any purpose to which it is adapted or may be applied. If lots
sought to be condemned are in use for market gardening purposes, and
are more valuable for that purpose than for any other, the owner will
have the right to show that fact; and hence there is no error in admit-
ting proof in such case of the value of the manure or compost on the
land per load: Chicago and Evanston Railroad Co. v. Jacobs, 110 Il1.
The case of Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Co. v.
Chdcago and Western Indiana Railroad Co., 100 Ill. 21, distin-
guished : Id.
DEOEIT. See Fraud.
DEED.
Delivery-Presmption.-Where a deed purported on its face to have
been delivered, and was duly recorded on the day after it was made, it
was admissible in evidence without further proof to show that it was
not only signed but delivered. The record of itself is presumptive
proof of delivery: Ross v. Campbell, 61 or 62 Ga.
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The attestation of the deed by a magistrate raises a like presump-
tion : Id.
Where the grantor gave in the lot conveyed for taxation as the pro-
perty of the grantee for several years succeeding the execution of the
deed, this was a strong manifdstation of the grantor's understanding
that he considered the deed delivered and the title conveyed. It may
be that the grantor would be estopped from denying his grantee's title ;
especially as he stated in conversations that he held the property as the
agent of 'the grantee : Id.
Where all these circumstances united, in the absence of explanation or
rebutting proof they would show the delivery of the deed, although it
was in the possession of the grantor when he died some years after its
date: Id.
EJEOTMENT.
Color of Title-Extent of Boundaries.-Color of title is that which
in appearance is a title, but in reality is not. It must be so far prima
facie good in appearance as to be consistent with the idea of good faith.
It must purport to transfer, and apparently transfer, the title to the
holder : Bolden v. Sherman, 110 Il.
A deed purporting to convey two lots of land in a subdivision by
their numbers, where the plat and stakes showed the precise location
of the lots sold, was held color of title to the entire lots as shown by
the plat and stakes, notwithstanding one of the lots, as shown by other
testimony, extended 'six feet over and upon an adjoining tract, and the
description in the deed showing distances did include the six fet on,
the adjoining land. The monuments always prevail over distances: Id.
EQUITY.
Injunction-Restraining Collection qf Judgment.-A court of equity
will not enjoin a judgment at law merely on the ground that the process
in the suit in which the judgment was rendered was not served on the
defendant. To justify the interposition of a court of equity in such a
case, it must be further shown that if the relief sought be granted, a
different result will be obtained from that already adjudged by the void
judgment. This is the rule under the common-law authorities: Colson
v. Leitch, 110 Ill.
Jurisdiction.-Where courts of equity and of law have concurrent
jurisdiction, and the former assumes it first, the suitor will not be
forced into a court of law unless at the beginning of the equity suit a
court of law could have given him as adequate and complete relief as
the court of equity could do : .llegas v. Dexter, 61 or 62 Ga.
Bill to quiet Title-Non-resident Defendnt-Jurisdiction.-Where a
bill was filed in this state alleging the purchase of land therein, the
payment of the purchase-money, a refusal by the vendor to make a
title to the.vendee, and that the former was a non-resident of the state
and seeking to enforce the purchase and quiet the title and possession,
the rule that a defendant in equity in this state must be sued in the
county of his residence, is inapplicable ; and the question of jurisdic-
tion is whether any court of equity in the state has jurisdiction : Harris
v. Palmore, 61 or 62 Ga.
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In such a case, a court of equity of this state has jurisdiction to
settle the title and to quiet the possession ; and a suitor will not be
forced into a foreign jurisdiction to settle the title to lands in this
state : Id.
ERRORS AND APPEALS.
Mandamus- Order Awarding is a Final Judgment-5000 Limit-
Writ of Error by Party to enforce Collection of Tax whose Interest
therein is less than that Amount.-An order awarding a peremptory
writ of mandamus is a final judgment 'in a civil action within the
meaning of that term as used in the statutes regulating writs of error
to the United States Supreme Court: Woodworth v. lair, S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1884.
Several judgment creditors whose claims aggregated over $5000,
obtained a levy of a certain tax to satisfy their claims, and united in
an application for a mandamus on the collector to compel the collection
of the tax. Held, that each creditor had the right to have the whole
tax collected for distribution among the creditors, and that the juris-
dictional limit must be measured by the amount of the whole tax and
not by any individual claim: Id.
Judgment of Highest Court bf a State-Execution- When Writ of
Error a Stersedeas.-The provision of section 1007 of the Revised
Statutes, that where a writ of error may be a supersedeas execution
shall not issue until the expiration of ten days, does not apply to judg-
ments in the highest court of a state, and a writ of error operates as a
supersedeas only from the time of the lodging of the writ in the office
of the clerk where the record to be re-examined remains. Therefore an
appointment by the proper authority, of a district attorney to fill a
vacancy caused by a removal by the Supreme Court of Kansas, made
'before the lodging of the writ of error in the clerk's office of the
Supreme Court was valid, although the appointing judge was informed
by the counsel of the plaintiff of the allowance of the writ of error, and
the approval of the supersedeas bond, before he made the appointment:
Foster v. The State, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
EVIDENCE. See Contract.
Non-expert Witness-Speed of Train.-A non-expert witness mayt
testify as to his estimate of the rate of speed at whiich a railroad train
was moving, but such an estimate is very unsatisfactory proof and
should be" received with great caution: Hobpe v. C., A. & St. P.
Railroad, 61 Wis.
EXECUTION. See Homestead.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
Action against-Statutory Notice- When necessary.-Where a statute
provides that no action shall be maintained against an administrator on
a claim against the intestate, unless demand was made on the adminis-
trator thirty days before the date of the writ, an action cannot be
maintained without such notice against an administratrix for default in
the payment of interest on a bond given by the intestate but on which
no default occurred in his lifetime : Boothby v. Boothby, 76 Me.
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FRAUD.
Misrepresentaton-.fiust be relied on-Scienter.-A party defendant
who has induced the plaintiff to subscribe and pay for stock in a cor-
poration through false representations of the value of such stock, &c.,
is not liable in an action on the case for fraud and deceit, if it appears
that the plaintiff did not rely upon the representations as charged in
the declaration, but upon the guaranty of the defendant: .oldom v.
Ayer, 110 Ill.
Where an agent of a mining company, by false representations as to
the value of the shares of stock in such company, or as to the extent
and condition of the property of the company, induces another "to sub-
scribe for and purchase shares of stock from the company, the agent
will not be liable to the purchaser in an action for fraud and deceit
unless he knew his representations were false when he made them.
Thq. fraud and the scienter constitute the grounds of the action : Id.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See Contract.
Promise to pay Debt of Another.-A promise by a third person to
assume and pay a sum due to a creditor in consideration of the dis-
charge of the original debtor, accompanied or followed by such absolute
discharge, is an original and not a collateral promise, founded on a suf-
ficient consideration, and need not be in writing: Wittemore v. Went-
worth, 76 Me.
HOMESTEAD.
Exemption- lntention to Occupy-Materials for Dwelling-Notice.-
The. bona fide intention to acquire certain land for a homestead, evi-
denced by overt acts in fitting it for such purpose and followed within
a reasonable time by actual occupancy, renders such land exempt from
the time of its purchase with such intent; and such exemption covers
also the material actually upon the ground and designed for use in the
construction of a dwelling-house, well or other essential of a homestead:
Scofield v. Hopkins, 61 Wis.
Where the judgment creditors are the purchasers at an execution sale
of land, they are presumed to know what the debtor has done and is
doing on the land, indicating an intention to make it his homestead,
and if such intention is manifest, no notice to them that he claims the
premises as a homestead is necessary to prevent a waiver of the exemp-
tion : Id.
Requisite to Consttute-Hfouseholder-Family.-Under the statute,
to create an estate of homestead three things must occur: 1st. The
person must be a householder. 2d. He or she must have a family;
and 3d. The property must be occupied as a residence. If either of
these requisites is wanting the law will not create the estate : Rock v.
Hfaas, 110 Ill.
Under the statute relating to homesteads, a person owning a dwell-
ing-house that is capable of being occupied as such, is a house-
holder: Id.
Under the Homestead Act a family is a collection of persons living
together-hence one person cannot constitute a family. Nor can a
person and his or her children, permanently separated, constitute
a family. A person never having been married, and having no family,
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or a man or woman having once been married but having no family, can-
not claim an estate of homestead : Id.
Where a widow hiving children in another state, comes to this state,
leaving them in other homes, with no purpose of bringing them with
her, they cannot be said to constitute a family, with her at its head: Id.
To create the estate of homestead by reason of being husband and
wife, the relation must be legal and not pretended. The fact that a man
and woman may have lived together upon her premises before their
marriage, and they marry after a judgment against her becomes a lieu
upon the same, will not render the property exempt from sale under
the judgment: 7d.
Sale of-Levy on in Bands of Purchaser.-Where a homestead was
sold for the purpose of the removal of the family to another state and
the making of a reinvestment there, the reversionary interest of the
head of the family, in the hands of the purchaser, was subject to levy
and sale by a creditor of the former: City Bank v. Bryant, 61 or
62 Ga.
The policy of this state is to increase not diminish its population;
and the policy of the homestead laws in the constitution is to secure
homes to the people of the state, and to settle them permanently within
its limits; and in case of a sale of the homestead for reinvestment. the
intention is that such reinvestment shall also be within the state : Id.
While a purchaser may be subrogated to the rights of the head of
the family, yet a sale and removal from the state terminates any immu-
nity from levy, at least as to the reversion : Id.
Semble, that upon the removal of the debtor from the state his home-
stead terminated, and a levy on and sale of the reversion would carry
the entire title : Id.
INJUNCTION. See Equity.
LEASE. See Real Estate.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
rustee- Claim againstfor Trust-money.-At the death of a trustee
who had given no bond as such, if the identity of the trust fund or
property is lost, the cestui que trust stands in the position of a general
creditor of the estate ; or if the trust is not terminated the estate
becomes at once liable to a new trustee who may be appointed, and the
special statute of limitations applies to the demands for the trust funds
as it does to other claims against the estate, though a new trustee is not
appointed: .Fowler V. Dwe, 76 Me.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
Conspiracy to Convict by Pedury--NoZ. pros.--In an action against
several defendants for conspiring together to procure the plaintiff to be
indicted and convicted of a crime by false and perjured testimony, and
for causing him to be thus indicted and convicted by such false and
perjured testimony, the gist of the action is the alleged tort and not the
alleged conspiracy: Garing v. Fraser, 76 Me.
At common law an action does not lie against a witness for per.
jury : Id.
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A simple nol.pros. is not such a determination of an indictment as
will entitle the accused to maintain an action for malicious prosecu-
tion : Id.
MANDAMUS. See Errors and Appeals.
When it lies-Discretionary Matters.-Where a statute does not
impose an absolute obligation upon a county board to perform a certain
act, but clothes it with an ultimate discretion in the matter, or where
the statute is merely directory as to the act and not mandatory creating
an absolute duty, mandamus will not lie to compel the board to perform
the act: Board of Supervisors v. The People, 110 Ill.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See Negligence.
Injury to Employee-Defective Machinery-Neglience of Co-em-
ployee.-The plaintiff, a mason, employed with other masons, carpenters
and section men in the erection of a water-tank and wind-mill for the
defendant railroad company, was injured by the falling of a portion of
the frame-work for the wind-mill, which he was assisting to raise. The
apparatus for raising such frame-work consisted of a windlass or crab,
tackle, blocks, ropes, the water-tank itself, and an anchor post set in the
ground about sixty feet distant, all of which had been placed in position
and adjusted under the direction of the foreman. The fall of the frame-
work was caused by the giving away of the anchor post, which had not
been set in the ground to a sufficient depth. Held, that the whole
apparatus for hoisting could not be considered as a single machine
which the defendant was bound to furnish adjusted and in position to
do the work, but the placing and adjustment of the detached appliances
were a part of the work to be done. The injury was caused, therefore,
not by any failure of the defendant to furnish proper and safe machinery
or appliances, but by the negligence of the foreman in the management
of such appliances: Peschel v. C. ff. & St. P. Railroad. 61 Wis.
Such foreman had no general authority to employ or discharge the
men under him, but was subordinate to a master carpenter who had
that authority, and who had charge and control of the different gangs
of men working for the company, and gave directions to the foreman as
to what they were to do. Held, that the foreman was a fellow-servant
of the plaintiff engaged in a common employment, and that the company
was therefore not liable for the injury : Id.
Railroad-Negligence of Postal Clerk-Evidence.-A railroad com-
pany is not responsible for the negligent acts of postal clerks or agents
upon its trains: Master v. (. M. & St. 29. Railroad, 61 Wis.
I The evidence showed that a small mail-bag was thrown either from
the mail-car, express-car or baggage-car on a train by a person within
the car. The bag could not lawfully have been in any other than the
mail-car, and no person other than a postal clerk or agent could lawfully
enter such car or throw the bag therefrom. Held, that in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, it will be presumed that the bag was thrown
from the mail-car by a postal clerk or agent: JR.
The mail-bag was usually thrown from the train about 200 feet west
of the depot, and there was nQ evidence that it had ever been thrown
off at the depot prior to the occasion in question. Beld, that the rail-
road company was not chargeable with notice that it was likely to be
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thrown off at the depot, and hence was not bound to guard, by notice or
otherwise, against an injury to one of its employees resulting from its
being thrown off there : Id.
NEGLIGENCE. See Master and Servant.
Injury from Fire communicated by Locomotive Engine-Burden of
Proof as to the Cause-Remote and Proximate Cause.--The statute which
declares that in actions for damages for injury to property "occasioned
by fire communicated by any locomotive engine while passing along any
railroad," shall be prima facie evidence "to charge with negligence"
the owner or operator of the road at the time, was intended to charge
upon the company using the locomotive all injuries which are shown to
have resulted from fire from a passing train, unless the company
defendant can rebut such conclusion by proof showing that the loss was
not occasioned by its negligence: Chicago and Alton Railroad Co. v.
Pennell, 110 11.
Where a railway company, through negligence by the escape of fire
from its locomotive engine, sets fire to a depot, from which a hotel in
the vicinity is destroyed, to make the company liable to the owner of
the hotel t is not necessaly that the burning of the hotel should be so
certain to result from the burning of the depot that a reasonable person
could have foreseen that the hotel woukl burn, or that it probably
would. It is enough if it be a consequence so natural and direct that
a reasonable person might, and naturally would, see that it was liable to
result from the burning of the depot: .d.
Depot Grounds used in common by Servants of two Railroad Com-
*panies-Reciprocal Duties of the Companies-Contributory .egli-
gence.-Where two railroad companies have, by agreement, a joint
occupancy of depot grounds, in which their respective tracks are so
situated and used that the servants of the two compapies must neces-
sarily, in the proper discharge of their duties, pass over .ach other's
tracks, each company will owe the same duty to the servants of the
other company, in the matter of observing proper care for their safety
when crossing its tracks in the regular discharge of their duties, that it
does to its own servants when crossing the same tracks : Ill. Cent. Rail-
road Co. v. Frelka, 110 I1.
Where the servants of two railroad companies occupying the same
depot grounds with their respective tracks, are required, in the per-
formance of their duties, to pass over the tracks of both companies, a
sign erected upon the grounds warning all persons to keep off the
tracks, and informing them if they went upon them it would be at
their peril, would not be regarded as applying to the servants of either
company: Id.
Question for Jury-Nonsuit.-n a suit by an employee against a
railroad company for injuries inflicted by the negligence of a co-em-
ployee, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that the injury was
the result of neither fault or negligence on his part. The question of
negligence belongs peculiarly to the jury, and except in a clear case,
where there is no conflicting evidence showing that the employee was
in fault or was negligent, the court should not withhold the case from
the jury by awarding a nonsuit. Where the evidence upon this point
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was doubtful, it should have been submitted to the jury, and to grant a
nonsuit was error: .Redding v. E., T., V & G. Railroad, 61 or 62 Ga.
NUISANCE.
Smoke in a City.-If the effect of a dense smoke emitted from a
smoke-stack or chimney is detrimental to certain classes of property and
business within the limits of a city, and is a personal annoyance to the
public at large within the city, it is a public nuisance, whether so
declared by ordinance or not. Unless such in fact, the act of so
declaring it will not make it a public nuisance: Harmon v. The City
of Chicago, 110 Ill.
OFFICER. See United States.
PATENT.
Discretion of Commissioner of Patents in issuing them not subject to
Review by Secretary of the Interior.--The power of the Commissioner
of Patents to grant er refuse an application for letters patent for inven-
tions is committed to his judicial discretion, and his decision is not
subject to review by the heftd of his department, the Secretary of the
Interior: Butterworth v. United States, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term, 1884.
PRACTICE.
Continuance on Ground of Absence of Counsel.-The continuance of
cases on account of the absence of counsel is not favored, and such
absence is no cause for postponement, unless in case of necessity or
misconception. Absence without leave to attend trials of cases pending
in other courts, is no ground for continuance. Therefore, where one
of counsel representing a defendant was engaged in attendance upon the
Circuit Court of the United States, and the other was suddenly sum-
moned to attend a session of the Supreme Court to argue a case from a
circuit other than that in which he resided, and voluntarily left without
leave or application for delay. this furnished no ground for continua'nee
Cotton States Life Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 61 or 62 Ga.
RAILROAD. See Master and Servant; Negligence.
REAL ESTAFE.
-Lease of Property to which Title is inchoate-Effect of subsequent
Conveyance to Lessor.-A railroad company purchased property on time
contracts by which the purchase-money was to be fully paid within four
years, and a conveyance made when the payments were completed.
Immediately on making the purchase the company went into possession,
built on the property, and within a year leased all its lands and pro-
perty for 99 years. -Held, that the deed made at the end of'the four
years at once inured to the benefit of the lessee: Skidmore v. Pitts., C.
& St. L. Railway Co., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1884.
SET OpF. See Attachinent.
SUPERSEDEAS. See Errors and Appeals.
TRUSTEE. See Limitations, Statute of.
